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Abstract We study the market selection hypothesis in complete financial markets,
populated by heterogeneous agents. We allow for a rich structure of heterogene-
ity: individuals may differ in their beliefs concerning the economy, information and
learning mechanism, risk aversion, impatience and ‘catching up with the Joneses’
preferences. We develop new techniques for studying the long-run behavior of such
economies, based on Strassen’s functional law of the iterated logarithm. In particular,
we explicitly determine an agent’s survival index and show how the latter depends on
the agent’s characteristics. We use these results to study the long-run behavior of the
equilibrium interest rate and the market price of risk.
Keywords Natural selection · Heterogeneous equilibrium · Diverse beliefs ·
Learning · Survival index · Catching up with the Joneses
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1 Introduction
A fundamental question in the modern theory of financial economics is concerned
with the so-called market selection hypothesis, dating back to the ideas of Friedman
[16]. Motivated by the postulate that agents with inaccurate forecasts will eventually
be driven out of the economy, this hypothesis can be stated informally as “If you
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are so smart, why aren’t you rich?”. Formally, market selection in financial markets
examines the agents’ long-run survival1 capability and price impact in equilibrium
models. There is a vast body of literature dealing with this topic; see e.g. Blume and
Easley [7], Cvitanic´ et al. [11], Nishide and Rogers [25], Sandroni [27], and Yan
[32, 33].
This paper investigates the market selection hypothesis (or natural selection, for
short) and the long-run behavior of asset prices in a complete market setting with
highly heterogeneous investors. Individuals may differ in their beliefs concerning
the economy, information and learning mechanism, risk aversion, impatience (time
preference rate) and degree of habit formation. Each individual in our model is rep-
resented by a generalized version of the catching up with the Joneses power utility
function of Chan and Kogan [8]. This model of preferences is sometimes referred to
in the literature as exogenous habit formation, since it incorporates the impact of a
certain given stochastic process on the individual’s consumption policy. Agents are
assumed to possess only partial information regarding the events associated with the
evolution of the market. More precisely, the stochastic dynamics of the mean growth
rate of the economy2 are unobservable, and the agents’ information set consists of
the aggregate endowment and a publicly observable signal. Furthermore, agents are
allowed to have diverse beliefs concerning the values of the initial and average mean
growth rate. Individuals may be irrational in the way they interpret the public sig-
nal: some of them may be over- (or under-)confident about the informativeness of
the public signal. We use the standard way of modeling over- (or under-)confidence,
originated in Dumas et al. [14] and Scheinkman and Xiong [28]: we assume that
agents’ beliefs concerning the instantaneous correlation of the public signal with the
economy’s growth rate may differ from its actual value.3 The agents are rational in
the sense that they use a standard Kalman filter to update their expectations about
the economy’s growth rate. The heterogeneous filtering rules yield highly nontriv-
ial dynamics for the individual consumption and the equilibrium state price density,
determined by the market clearing condition. In particular, subjective probability den-
sities describing the agents’ beliefs give rise to multiple new state variables, which
govern the dynamics of the economy. We refer to Back [2] for a survey on filtering
and incomplete information in asset pricing theory.
Let us describe the contribution of this work to the literature on equilibrium and
natural selection. Firstly, as described above, we analyze a very general paradigm of
heterogeneous economies including diverse beliefs, Kalman filtering and exogenous
state-dependent habit formation preferences. We provide a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the equilibrium characteristics that can be used for further research in other
possible directions. Secondly, this complex setting in turn allows detecting which
traits (both behavioral-preferential and information-related) are beneficial for sur-
vival. That is, as in Yan [32], we reveal that there is a unique surviving agent in the
1An agent is said to survive in the long run if the ratio of his consumption to the aggregate consumption
stays positive with positive probability as time goes to infinity.
2We assume that the mean growth rate follows an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process.
3This is a realistic assumption as correlations are extremely difficult to estimate empirically.
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long run. Moreover, we show that the interest rate and the market price of risk be-
have asymptotically as those of an economy populated solely by this surviving agent.
Lastly, to derive our results, we develop new techniques based mainly on Strassen’s
functional law of the iterated logarithm. To the best of our knowledge, these methods
have never been used in the general equilibrium literature before.
The conclusions and implications on natural selection are as follows. Most im-
portantly, our findings indeed confirm, to a large extent, the validity of the market
selection hypothesis.
In a growing economy, the less effectively risk-averse4 agent is the one to survive
in the long run. This result is consistent with previous studies (see e.g. Cvitanic´ et al.
[11]). However, the impact of habit formation on the effective risk aversion, and thus
in particular on survival, is quite novel. As it turns out, if the (standard non-effective)
risk aversion coefficient is above one, then the individual with the strongest habit
will survive. Intuitively, this makes sense, as aggressiveness in a growing economy
among somewhat moderate individuals is supposed to be a plus. On the other hand,
if the (standard non-effective) level of risk aversion is below one (i.e., individuals
are relatively risk-seeking in the classical sense), the agent with the lowest degree of
habit formation will dominate. This is not surprising at all, as excess aggressiveness
can cause bubbles leading to extinction.
Some of our conclusions concerning the interaction of diverse beliefs and survival
are quite intriguing, and seem to be quite hard to predict without a delicate analysis.
When agents differ only in their beliefs concerning the average mean growth rate,
the one with the most accurate forecast will dominate the market, as expected. If all
agents are over-confident (or under-confident), then, again, the agent with the best
guess will beat the others. However, if some agents are over-confident and others are
under-confident, the situation is more complex. For instance, it may happen that in a
situation where the public signal provides some relevant information about the mar-
ket, the surviving agent will be the one who (wrongly) believes that this signal is a
pure noise, whereas the agent who is significantly over-confident in the informative-
ness of the signal will be eliminated from the economy. Furthermore, in some cases,
agents that believe in a negative correlation of the signal will survive, while individ-
uals who believe in a (too high) positive correlation will become extinct, despite an
actual positive correlation. See Fig. 1 for an example describing these phenomena.
Even though it is somewhat debatable which property of the preceding two can be
considered a more rational one, we still learn that theoretically, the market selection
hypothesis is valid, at least in some modified form.
We now review some related works. The most closely related to ours are the papers
by Yan [32] and Cvitanic´ et al. [11].5 Specifically, these authors consider a special
case of our model corresponding to the case when there is no learning and agents
have standard CRRA preferences without any habit formation. In terms of modeling
heterogeneous beliefs and learning, our model closely follows the one of Dumas et al.
[14] and Scheinkman and Xiong [28], who considered a special case of our model:
4In our model, the effective risk aversion depends on the level of habit formation (see (4.1)).
5Bhamra and Uppal [5], Dumas [13] and Wang [29] considered the same model, but with only two agent
types and heterogeneity coming only from risk aversion.
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a two-agent economy with standard CRRA utility functions, and the public signal
being a pure noise, uncorrelated with the economy’s growth rate. Chan and Kogan
[8] consider a special case of our model with homogeneous ‘catching up with the
Joneses’ habit levels and a continuum of agents with heterogeneous risk aversions.
Xiouros and Zapatero [31] derive a closed form expression for the equilibrium state
price density in the Chan and Kogan [8] model. Cvitanic´ and Malamud [9] study how
long-run risk sharing depends on the presence of multiple agents with different levels
of risk aversion. Kogan et al. [21] and Cvitanic´ and Malamud [10] study the interac-
tion of survival and price impact in economies where agents derive utility only from
terminal consumption. Fedyk et al. [15] extend the model of Yan [32] by allowing for
many assets. Kogan et al. [22] study the link between survival and price impact in the
presence of intermediate consumption, and allow for general utilities with unbounded
relative risk aversion and a general dividend process. Another quite significant direc-
tion of the complete market risk sharing literature concentrates on the equilibrium
effects of heterogeneous beliefs. Bhamra and Uppal [6] derive a characterization of
the equilibrium state price density by means of an infinite series that admits a closed
form solution for specific coefficients, in a two-agent economy with diverse beliefs
and heterogenous CRRA preferences. With CRRA agents differing only in their be-
liefs, the equilibrium state price density can be derived in a closed form, and thus
many equilibrium properties can be analyzed in detail. See e.g. Basak [3, 4], Jouini
and Napp [18, 19], Jouini et al. [20] and Xiong and Yan [30].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the model and provide
some preliminary results. Section 3 is devoted to a brief description of the equilibrium
state price density in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings. In Sect. 4, we present
the main result of the paper and discuss some implications. Section 5 deals with some
auxiliary results that are crucial for the proof of the main result. In Sect. 6, we prove
the main result. Finally, in Sect. 7 we establish long-run results for the interest rate
and the market price of risk. Some of the results appearing in Sects. 5 and 7 are of
independent mathematical interest.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a continuous-time Arrow–Debreu economy with an infinite horizon in
which heterogeneous agents maximize their utility functions from consumption. The
uncertainty in our model is captured by a (complete) probability space (Ω, F∞,P )
and a continuous filtration F := (Ft )t∈[0,∞), with F0 = {∅,Ω}. We fix three standard
and independent Wiener processes (W(i)t )t∈[0,∞), i = 1,2,3, adapted to the filtration
F . There are N different types of agent in the economy, labeled by i = 1, . . . ,N .
Each agent i is equipped with a nonnegative endowment process (it )t∈[0,∞) adapted
to the filtration G (see (2.5)). We denote by Dt := ∑Ni=1 it the aggregate endowment
process and assume that (Dt )t∈[0,∞) satisfies
dDt
Dt
= μDt dt + σD dW(1)t , D0 = 1,
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or equivalently
Dt = exp
(∫ t
0
μDs ds −
1
2
(
σD
)2
t + σDW(1)t
)
, (2.1)
where the constant σD > 0 represents the volatility. The mean growth rate
(μDt )t∈[0,∞) is an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process that solves uniquely the SDE
dμDt = −ξ
(
μDt − μ
)
dt + σμ dW(2)t , μD0 = μ,
that is,
μDt = μ + (μ0 − μ)e−ξ t + σμe−ξ t
∫ t
0
eξs dW(2)s , (2.2)
where μ,μ0 and σμ are some real numbers and ξ > 0. The numbers μ,μ0 will be
referred to as the average and initial mean growth rate, respectively.
2.1 The financial market
We consider a financial market that consists of at least two long-lived securities: a
risky stock (St )t∈[0,∞) and a bank account (S0t )t∈[0,∞). In addition to this, there are
other (not explicitly modeled) assets guaranteeing that the market is dynamically
complete6 for G -adapted claims (where the filtration G := (Gt )t∈[0,∞) is defined in
(2.5)). We emphasize that this filtration coincides with the symmetric information
shared by all agents. The bond is in zero net supply and the stock is a claim to the
total endowment of the economy (Dt )t∈[0,∞) and has a net supply of one share. The
riskless bond is given by S0t = e
∫ t
0 rs ds , where (rt )t∈[0,∞) is the riskfree rate process.
We assume a unique positive state price density denoted by (Mt)t∈[0,∞), that is, a
positive process adapted to G that satisfies
Mt = E
[
e
∫ u
t rs dsMu
∣
∣Gt
]
for all u > t , and
St = E
[∫ ∞
t
Mu
Mt
Du du
∣
∣
∣
∣Gt
]
for all t > 0. Note that our assumption excludes arbitrage opportunities in the model.
The state price density, as well as all other parameters, are to be derived endogenously
in equilibrium.
6In this setting, the model can be implemented by a complete securities market with a unique state price
density derived in equilibrium (as for instance in Duffie and Huang [12]). More specifically, the filtration
G is generated by the Brownian motion s (which is interpreted as a public signal) and the aggregate
endowment process D. Nevertheless, as explained in Remark 2.6, the filtration G is also generated by the
Brownian motions s and W(0) . Thereby, the market can be completed by adding one additional security to
S. However, since the price of this security would be determined endogenously, one would have to verify
endogenous completeness. This can be done by using the techniques of Hugonnier et al. [17]. Otherwise,
we can just assume that there are sufficiently many (derivative) assets, completing the market.
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2.2 Preferences and equilibrium
Agent i is maximizing his intertemporal von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility,
sup
(cit )t∈[0,∞)
EP
i
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρi tUi(cit ) dt
]
,
from consumption, under the constraints that the consumption stream (cit )t∈[0,∞) is
a positive process adapted to G (which is defined in (2.5)) and lies in the budget set,
E
[∫ ∞
0
citMt dt
]
≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
it Mt dt
]
.
Here, EPi [·] stands for the expectation with respect to the subjective probability mea-
sure Pi of agent i. The exact form of Pi is specified in (2.13). We assume that all
agents are represented by ‘catching up with the Joneses’7 preferences
Ui(cit ) = 11 − γi
(
cit
Hit
)1−γi
.
The subjective ‘standard of living’ index (Hit )t∈[0,∞) is defined through a certain
geometric average of the aggregate endowment process. We consider here a more
general specification for Hit than the one in Chan and Kogan [8]. Namely, we set
Hit = eβixt for some βi ≥ 0, where
xt = e−λt
(
x0 + λ
∫ t
0
eλs logDs ds
)
, (2.3)
or, equivalently, (xt )t∈[0,∞) solves the SDE
dxt = λ(logDt − xt ) dt.
For each agent i, the number βi measures the impact of the index xt on the agent;
in particular, when βi = 0, the agent is not influenced by the index at all. For large
βi , the influence is somewhat heavy. In complete markets, the optimal consumption
stream can be easily derived as in the following statement.
Proposition 2.1 The optimal consumption stream of agent i in a complete market
represented by a state price density (Mt)t∈[0,∞) is given by
cit = e
ρi
γi
t
M
− 1
γi
t Z
1
γi
it H
γi−1
γi
it ci0,
7This paradigm of a utility function was first introduced in Abel [1], and is commonly referred to in the
literature as a utility with exogenous habits. This specification describes a decision maker who experiences
an impact of the ‘standard of living’ index.
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and
E
[∫ ∞
0
cit ξt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
itMt
]
,
where the density process (Zit )t∈[0,∞) is given in (2.13).
Proof The assertion follows by standard duality arguments involving the first-order
conditions. 
Finally, we introduce the notion of Arrow–Debreu equilibrium.
Definition 2.2 An equilibrium is a pair ((cit )t∈[0,∞), (Mt )t∈[0,∞)) such that
(a) Each process (cit )t∈[0,∞) is the optimal consumption stream of agent i, and
(Mt)t∈[0,∞) is the state price density that represents the market.
(b) The market clearing condition is satisfied, i.e.,
N∑
i=1
cit = Dt (2.4)
for all t > 0.
2.3 Diverse beliefs and learning
There are two processes in the economy that are observable by all agents. The first
one is the aggregate endowment process (Dt )t∈[0,∞), and the second one is a certain
public signal
st = φW(2)t +
√
1 − φ2W(3)t ,
for some φ ∈ [0,1). That is, the public signal exhibits a nonnegative correlation
φ ∈ [0,1) with the shock governing the mean growth rate process. The corresponding
filtration is denoted by
Gt := σ
({su;u ≤ t} ∪ {Du;u ≤ t}
)
. (2.5)
In contrast to this, the mean growth rate process is unobservable. That is, neither
of the agents possesses access to the data revealing the dynamics of the process
(μDt )t∈[0,∞). Furthermore, agents may have diverse beliefs concerning the average
and initial mean growth rate. More precisely, each agent i believes that the initial
mean growth rate is some μ0i ∈ R and that the average mean growth rate is some
μi ∈ R. That is to say, before filtering, agent i assigns in his mind for μDt the model
μi + (μi0 − μi)e−ξ t + σμe−ξ t
∫ t
0
eξs dW(2)s . (2.6)
Furthermore, individuals may have an irrational perception of the signal. Concretely,
each agent i believes that the public signal (st )t∈[0,∞) has a correlation φi ∈ [−1,1)
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with (W(2)t )t∈[0,∞), when in fact the correlation is φ ∈ [0,1). Therefore, under the
belief of agent i, the model attributed to the signal st is
φiW
(2)
t +
√
1 − φ2i W (3)t . (2.7)
We denote by Qi the measure corresponding to agent i’s beliefs regarding the models
in (2.6) and (2.7), where W(1),W(2) and W(3) are independent Wiener processes
under Qi . Consequently, agents are in the process of learning and filtering out the
dynamics of the mean growth rate, which is deduced by using the theory of optimal
filtering.
Definition 2.3 The process
μDit := EQ
i
[
μi + (μi0 − μi)e−ξ t + σμe−ξ t
∫ t
0
eξs dW(2)s
∣
∣
∣
∣Gt
]
is called the subjective mean growth rate of agent i.
Proposition 2.4 We have
μDit =
μi0
yit
+ ξμi
yit
∫ t
0
yiu du + 1
(σD)2yit
∫ t
0
νiuyiu
Du
dDu + σ
μφi
yit
∫ t
0
yiu dsu, (2.8)
where
yit = exp
(
ξ t + 1
(σD)2
∫ t
0
νis ds
)
, (2.9)
and the variance process
νit := EQi
[(
μDt − EQ
i [
μDt |Gt
])2∣∣Gt
]
is deterministic and given by
νit = αi2
(
σD
)2 e(αi2−αi1)t − 1
e(αi2−αi1)t − αi2/αi1 , (2.10)
where
αi2 =
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i
) − ξ,
and
αi1 = −
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i
) − ξ.
Proof Observe that Theorem 12.7 in Liptser and Shiryaev [24] implies that
(μDit )t∈[0,∞) satisfies the SDE
dμDit = −ξ
(
μDit − μi
)
dt + νit
(σD)2
(
dDt
Dt
− μDit dt
)
+ σμφi dst , (2.11)
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where the variance process νit is detected through the Riccati ODE
ν′it = −2ξνit + (σμ)2
(
1 − φ2i
) − 1
(σD)2
ν2it ,
with νi0 = 0. One can solve the above equation and verify that νit is given by (2.10).
Now, we shall solve the SDE (2.11). By definition, we have y′it = (ξ + νit(σD)2 )yit , and
yi0 = 1. Notice that the preceding observation combined with Itô’s formula implies
that
d
(
yitμ
D
it
) = ξμiyit dt +
νit
(σD)2
yit
dDt
Dt
+ σμφiyit dst ,
completing the proof. 
Remark 2.5 Dumas et al. [14] consider the static version of (2.8). That is, the func-
tions νit and yit are substituted by the corresponding asymptotic limits. This can be
justified by Lemma 5.1 of the current paper.
We denote by i = 0 a fictional agent who is rational in the sense that he knows
the correct average, initial mean growth rate and the correlation parameter φ. Let us
denote by μD0t := EP [μDt |Gt ] the estimated mean growth rate of this agent. As in
Proposition 2.4, we have
μD0t =
μ0
y0t
+ ξμ
y0t
∫ t
0
y0u du + 1
(σD)2y0t
∫ t
0
ν0uy0u
Du
dDu + σ
μφ
y0t
∫ t
0
y0u dsu,
where y0t and ν0t are defined similarly to (2.9) and (2.10). It can be shown as in
Theorem 8.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev [23] that W(0)t = W(1)t −
∫ t
0
μD0s−μDs
σD
ds is a
P -Brownian motion with respect to the filtration G .
Remark 2.6 The filtration G is generated by the public signal s and the Brownian
motion W(0). To see this, note that
dDt
Dt
= μD0t dt + σD dW(0)t ,
and
dμD0t = −ξ
(
μD0t − μ
)
dt + ν0t
σD
dW
(0)
t + σμφ dst .
We set
δit := μ
D
it − μD0t
σD
(2.12)
to be the ith agent’s error in the mean growth rate estimation. The dynamics of
(Dt )t∈[0,∞) from the ith agent’s perspective admit the form
dDt
Dt
= μDit dt + σD dW(0)it ,
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where
dW
(0)
it = dW(0)t − δit dt
is a Brownian motion (by Girsanov’s theorem) under the equivalent probability mea-
sure8 Pi and the filtration G , where
Zit := E
[
dP i
dP
∣
∣
∣
∣Gt
]
= exp
(∫ t
0
δis dW
(0)
s −
1
2
∫ t
0
δ2is ds
)
. (2.13)
Let us stress that W(0)i is also a Q
i
-Brownian motion with respect to the filtration
G . In particular, this implies that by restricting the measure Qi to the sigma-algebra
generated by W(0)i , we get the measure P i . Nevertheless, the measures Qi and P (the
physical probability measure) are singular on the sigma-algebra (see (2.6) and (2.7))
generated by the Brownian motions W(1),W(2) and W(3).
3 The equilibrium state price density
In the current section, we depict the structure of the equilibrium state price density
(SPD) in both settings of homogeneous and heterogeneous economies.
3.1 Homogeneous economy
Consider an economy where all agents are of the same type i, and denote by
(Mit )t∈[0,∞) the corresponding equilibrium state price density. The homogeneity of
the economy combined with the completeness of the market allows us to derive the
corresponding state price density in a closed form.
Lemma 3.1 The equilibrium state price density in a market populated by one agent
of type i is given by
Mit = e−ρi tD−γit ZitHγi−1it
= exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(
ρi + γi
(
μD0s −
1
2
(
σD
)2
)
+ 1
2
δ2is
)
ds
)
× exp
(
(γi − 1)βixt +
∫ t
0
(
δis − γiσD
)
dW(0)s
)
. (3.1)
Proof The assertion follows by using the market clearing condition and Lemma 2.1.

We derive next the riskfree rate and the market price of risk in a homogeneous
economy.
8One can check that the process (Zit )t∈[0,∞) is a true martingale by verifying Novikov’s condition on a
small interval and then applying a similar argument to the one used in Example 3 in Sect. 6.2 in Liptser
and Shiryaev [23].
Market selection with learning and catching up with the Joneses 283
Lemma 3.2 The riskfree rate and the market price of risk in an economy populated
by one agent of type i are given, respectively, by
rit := ρi + γiμDit −
1
2
(
σD
)2
γi(γi + 1) − βi(γi − 1)(xt − logDt)
and
θit := γiσD − δit .
Proof Consider the process
Yit := −
∫ t
0
(
ρi + γi
(
μD0s −
1
2
(
σD
)2
)
+ 1
2
δ2is
)
ds + (γi − 1)βixt
+
∫ t
0
(
δis − γiσD
)
dW(0)s .
The dynamics of Mi are given by
dMit
Mit
= dYit + 12d〈Yi, Yi〉t ,
where
dYit = −
(
ρi + γi
(
μDt −
1
2
(
σD
)2
)
+ 1
2
δ2it
)
dt
+ βi(γi − 1)(logDt − xt ) dt +
(
δit − γiσD
)
dW
(0)
t ,
and
d〈Yi, Yi〉t =
(
δit − γiσD
)2
dt.
The rest of the proof follows from the fact that the riskfree rate and the market price of
risk coincide with minus the drift and minus the volatility of the SPD, respectively. 
3.2 Heterogeneous economy
Consider an economy populated by N different types of agent. By Lemma 2.1, the
optimal consumption stream of agent i is given by
cit = e−
ρi
γi
t
M
− 1
γi
t Z
1
γi
it H
γi−1
γi
it ci0 = ci0
(
Mit
Mt
)1/γi
Dt , (3.2)
where (Mt)t∈[0,∞) stands for the corresponding heterogeneous equilibrium state price
density, and Mit is given by (3.1). Therefore, the market clearing condition (2.4)
admits the form
N∑
i=1
ci0
(
Mit
Mt
)1/γi
= 1. (3.3)
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Example 3.3 Consider a homogeneous risk aversion economy where we have
γ1 = · · · = γN = γ . Then the equilibrium state price density is given explicitly by
Mt =
(
N∑
i=1
ci0e−ρi t/γ Z1/γit H
γ−1
γ
it
Dt
)γ
.
Furthermore, if the habits are homogeneous, that is, β1 = · · · = βN = β , we have
Mt = e(γ−1)βxt
(
N∑
i=1
ci0eρi t/γ Z
1/γ
it
Dt
)γ
.
If the beliefs among the agents are not varying, i.e., Z1t = · · · = ZNt = Zt , then we
have
Mt = Zt
(
N∑
i=1
ci0eρi t/γ H
γ−1
γ
it
Dt
)γ
.
Finally, we provide formulas for the riskfree rate and the market price of risk.
Proposition 3.4 We have
θt =
N∑
i=1
ωit θit
and
rt =
N∑
i=1
ωit rit + 12
N∑
i=1
(1 − 1/γi)ωit (θit − θt )2,
where
ωit := cit /γi∑N
j=1 cjt /γj
denotes the relative level of absolute risk tolerance of agent i.
Proof The proof is identical to the one of Proposition 4.1 in Cvitanic´ et al. [11]. 
4 The main result: the long-run surviving consumer
The current section is devoted to the study of the long-run behavior of the optimal
consumption shares in a heterogeneous economy. We establish the existence of a
surviving consumer in the market, i.e., an agent whose optimal consumption asymp-
totically behaves as the aggregate consumption. This dominating individual is de-
termined through the survival index. The survival index is a quantity depending on
individuals’ characteristics and specifies the surviving agent versus the agents to be-
come extinct in the economy.
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Definition 4.1 The survival index of agent i is given by
κi := ρi +
(
μ − 1
2
(
σD
)2
)
(
γi + (1 − γi)βi
)
+ 1
2
(
μi − μ
σD
)2
+ ξ
2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i )
.
The following is assumed throughout the entire paper.
Assumption There exists an agent IK whose survival index is the lowest one, namely
κIK < κi , for all i = IK .
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 4.2 In equilibrium, the only surviving agent in the long run is the one with
the lowest survival index, i.e.,
lim
t→∞
cit
Dt
= 0
for all i = IK , and
lim
t→∞
cIK t
Dt
= 1.
The survival index is a complicated function of the individuals’ underlying param-
eters. In order to isolate the effects of various agents’ characteristics on the long-run
survival, we discuss special cases in which agents differ with respect to only one or a
few particular parameters.
4.1 The effect of risk aversion and habits
Let the initial priors (μi)i=1,...,N and the over-confidence parameters (φi)i=1,...,N be
fixed and identical for all agents. As will be seen in the proof of Theorem 4.2, the
survival index is invariant under additive translation, and thus it is determined in the
current setting by
ρi +
(
μ − (σ
D)2
2
)
(
γi + (1 − γi)βi
)
.
If β1 = · · · = βN = 0, the survival index is the same as in Cvitanic´ et al. [11]. In
particular, in a growing economy (i.e., μ − (σD)2/2 > 0), the least risk-averse agent
will survive in the long run, as in the models of Yan [32], and Cvitanic´ et al. [11]. The
presence of habits may change the behavior. Here, if the habit is sufficiently strong
(βi > 1), the effect completely reverses: It is the most risk-averse agent who survives
in the long run. Effectively, ‘catching up with the Joneses’ preferences change an
agent’s risk aversion from γi to
γi + (1 − γi)βi . (4.1)
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Therefore, for strong habits, agents with a high risk aversion effectively behave as
agents with a low risk aversion. When risk aversion is homogeneous, the effect of
habits’ strength on survival depends on whether risk aversion is above or below 1.
If risk aversion is above 1, we get the surprising, and at first sight counter-intuitive,
result that agents with stronger habits survive in the long run. The reason for this
is that the presence of habits forces the agent to trade more aggressively and make
bets on very good realizations of the dividend in order to sustain the aggregate habit
level generated by the ‘catching up with the Joneses’ preferences. This makes an
agent with strong habits effectively less risk averse. This is beneficial for survival in
a growing economy.
4.2 The effect of diverse beliefs
Consider an economy where agents may differ only with respect to their aver-
age mean growth rate estimations (μi)i=1,...,N and their correlation parameters
(φi)i=1,...,N . In this case, the survival index admits the form
κi = 12
(
μi − μ
σD
)2
+ ξ
2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i )
.
Note that in this case the survival index is a decreasing function of the correlation
parameter φi in the interval [−1, φ], and an increasing function in the interval (φ,1].
Therefore, in an economy where the only distinction between agents comes from
their correlation parameters, the surviving agent is derived as follows. If either all
agents are over-confident (φ < φi , for all i = 1, . . . ,N ) or under-confident (φ > φi ,
for all i = 1, . . . ,N ), then the survival index is given by
|φi − φ|,
and thus the individual with the most accurate guess of the correct correlation
will dominate the market. If some agents are over-confident and some are under-
confident in the signal, the situation becomes more complex. For simplicity, let us
analyze the case of an economy which consists of two agents: the first agent un-
derestimates the correlation and believes that it is φ1 ∈ [−1, φ], whereas the sec-
ond agent overestimates the correlation by φ2 ∈ [φ,1]. Let us set a := t ( ξσDσμ )2.
If φ1 ∈ [−1,2 aφ(1+a)aφ2+(a+1−φ)2 − 1], the second agent will survive. Now, assume that
φ1 ∈ [2 aφ(1+a)aφ2+(a+1−φ)2 − 1, φ]. Then if φ2 ∈ [φ, 2(a+1)φ−(a+1+φ
2)φ1
a+1+φ2−2φφ1 ], the second agent
will survive; otherwise, namely if φ2 ∈ [ 2(a+1)φ−(a+1+φ2)φ1a+1+φ2−2φφ1 ,1], the first agent will
survive. To demonstrate the above scheme numerically, let us consider the case where
a = 1 and φ = 1/2 (see Fig. 1). If φ1 ∈ [−1,−0.2], then the second agent will sur-
vive. If φ1 ∈ [−0.2,0.5], then, if φ2 ∈ [0.5, 8−9φ19−4φ1 ], the second agent is the one to
survive. Otherwise, if φ2 ∈ [ 8−9φ19−4φ1 ,1], then the first agent will survive. The preced-
ing fact yields an economically surprising observation: too over-confident agents will
not survive when they compete with agents that believe in a weak negative correla-
tion. Assume for instance that the second agent believes that the correlation is some
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Fig. 1 The long-run surviving consumer
φ2 ∈ [8/9,1]. Then, if φ1 ∈ [ 8−9φ29−4φ2 ,0], the first agent will survive, despite the nega-
tive correlation. This is very surprising, since irrational agents who believe in a non-
positive correlation happen to survive, whereas individuals with an overestimation of
the signal will become extinct.
If the only source of heterogeneity in the economy is the belief regarding the
average mean growth rate, then the survival index depends only on the error between
the subjective mean growth rate and the correct one, namely,
κi = |μ − μi |.
Therefore, the consumer with the best forecast of the average mean growth rate is the
one to dominate the market.
4.3 The relative level of absolute risk tolerance
As in Cvitanic´ et al. [11], we define the relative level of absolute risk tolerance of
agent i by
wit := cit /γi∑N
j=1 cjt /γj
.
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 4.3 We have
lim
t→∞wit = 0
for all i = Ik , and
lim
t→∞wIKt = 1.
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Proof Note that (3.2) implies that
wit = cit
Dt
1/γi
∑N
j=1 c0j /γj (Mjt/Mt)1/γj
.
The identity (3.3) yields
1
∑N
j=1 1γj c0j (Mjt/Mt)
1/γj
≤ max
k=1,...,N
γk.
The preceding observations combined with Theorem 4.2 and the equality∑N
i=1 ωit = 1 complete the proof of Corollary 4.3. 
5 Auxiliary results
In the present section, we provide some results that will be crucial for proving The-
orem 4.2. First, we introduce the following estimates, indicating that yit , 1/yit , their
derivatives and νit are close to certain functions of a simpler form. The errors in these
estimates are shown to be decaying exponentially fast to 0 as t → ∞.
Lemma 5.1 We have
∣
∣νit − αi2
(
σD
)2∣∣ ≤ Ce−2(αi2+ξ)t , (5.1)
∣
∣
∣
∣yit − exp
(
−αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤ Ce−(αi2+ξ)t , (5.2)
∣
∣
∣
∣y
′
it − (αi2 + ξ) exp
(
−αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤ Ce−(αi2+ξ)t (5.3)
and
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
yit
− exp
(
αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1
)
e−(αi2+ξ)t
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤ Ce−3(αi2+ξ)t , (5.4)
∣
∣
∣
∣
(
1
yit
)′
+ (αi2 + ξ) exp
(
αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1
)
e−(αi2+ξ)t
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤ Ce−3(αi2+ξ)t , (5.5)
for all t > 0 and some constant C > 0.
Proof Inequality (5.1) is due to the fact that
∣
∣νit − αi2
(
σD
)2∣∣ =
∣
∣
∣
∣
(αi1 − αi2)αi2(σD)2
αi1e2(αi2+ξ)t − αi2
∣
∣
∣
∣.
Next, by definition (see Proposition 2.4), it follows that yit admits the form
yit = exp
(
(αi2 + ξ)t − αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1
(
1 − e−2(αi2+ξ)t)
)
.
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One checks that the inequality ex − 1 ≤ (e − 1)x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, concludes the
validity of (5.2). Recall that yi satisfies the ODE y′it = (ξ + νit(σD)2 )yit , and thus we
can estimate
∣
∣
∣
∣y
′
it − (αi2 + ξ) exp
(
−αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣
∣
∣
∣
≤ exp
(
−αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣
∣
∣
∣
νit
(σD)2
− αi2
∣
∣
∣
∣
+
(
ξ + νit
(σD)2
)∣
∣
∣
∣yit − exp
(
−αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣
∣
∣
∣,
which implies (5.3) by applying (5.1) and (5.2). The inequalities (5.4) and (5.5) are
proved in a similar manner. 
For d ≥ 1, we denote by (C0([0,1];Rd),‖ ·‖∞) the space of all Rd -valued contin-
uous functions on the interval [0,1] vanishing at 0, endowed with the sup topology.
Definition 5.2 We denote by K(d) the space of all functions f = (f1, . . . , fd) in
C0([0,1];Rd) such that each component fi is absolutely continuous and
d∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(
f ′i (x)
)2
dx ≤ 1.
We note that K(d) is a compact subset of C0([0,1];Rd) (see Proposition VIII.2.7
in Revuz and Yor [26]). The next result deals with the asymptotics of certain multiple
stochastic integrals.
Lemma 5.3 Let (Wt )t∈[0,∞) and (Bt )t∈[0,∞) be two arbitrary standard Brownian
motions and denote Zt =
∫ t
0 e
−sW 1
2 (e
2s−1) dBs . Then we have
(i)
〈Z〉∞ := lim
t→∞〈Z〉t = ∞.
(ii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−as ∫ s
0 e
au dWu dBs
t
= 0 for any a > 0.
(iii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
au
∫ u
0 e
bx dWx dudBs
t
= 0 for all a, b > 0.
Proof (i) First, note that a change of variable implies that
〈Z〉t =
∫ t
0
e−2s(W 1
2 (e
2s−1))
2 ds =
∫ 1
2 (e
2t−1)
0
W 2u
(1 + u)2 du.
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Consider the functional F : C0([0,1];R) → R+ given by
F(f ) :=
∫ 1
0
f 2(x)
(1 + x)2 dx.
Note that F is continuous. Indeed, for a fixed f ∈ C0([0,1];R) and all ε > 0, let
δ = ε(2‖f ‖∞+ε) and observe that ‖f −g‖∞ < δ for some g ∈ C0([0,1];R) implies
|F(f ) − F(g)| < ε. It follows by Strassen’s functional law of the iterated logarithm
(see Theorem VIII.2.12 in Revuz and Yor [26]) that P-a.s.,
lim sup
N→∞
F
(
1√
2N log logN
WNt
)
= sup
h∈K(1)
F (h).
Notice that suph∈K(1) F (h) ≥ F(h˜) > 0, where h˜(x) = x. Therefore, we have
lim sup
N→∞
F
(
1√
2N log logN
WNt
)
= lim sup
N→∞
∫ 1
0
WNt
(1+t)2 dt
2N log logN
= lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(N+u)2 du
2 log logN
> 0.
Furthermore,
lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(1+u)2 du
2 log logN
≥ lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(N+u)2 du
2 log logN
> 0.
In particular, it follows that
lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(1 + u)2 du = ∞,
but since N → ∫ N0 W
2
u
(1+u)2 du is increasing, we get limN→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(1+u)2 du = ∞. This
accomplishes the proof of part (i).
(ii) Denote Yt =
∫ t
0 e
−s ∫ s
0 e
u dWu dBs and Xs =
∫ s
0 e
u dWu. Note that we have
〈X〉t = 12 (e2t − 1). Since X is a martingale null at 0 and 〈X〉∞ = ∞, it follows by
the Dambis–Dubins–Schwarz theorem (shortly DDS, see Theorem V.1.6 in Revuz
and Yor [26]) that Xt = W˜ 1
2 (e
2t−1) for some Brownian motion W˜ . Therefore, we can
rewrite
Yt =
∫ t
0
e−sW˜ 1
2 (e
2s−1) dBs,
and thus by part (i), we have limt→∞〈Y 〉t = 〈Y 〉∞ = ∞. It follows from the DDS the-
orem that Yt = B˜〈Y 〉t , for some Brownian motion B˜ . Now, denote
φ(x) = √2x log logx and rewrite Yt
t
= B˜〈Y 〉t
φ(〈Y 〉t )
φ(〈Y 〉t )
t
. By the law of the iterated log-
arithm, we have that lim supt→∞
|B˜〈Y 〉t |
φ(〈Y 〉t ) ≤ 1, and hence it is enough to concentrate
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on the asymptotics of the second term
φ(〈Y 〉t )
t
=
√
2
∫ t
0 e
−2s(W˜ 1
2 (e
2t−1))2 ds log log(
∫ t
0 e
−2s(W˜ 1
2 (e
2t−1))2 ds)
t2
.
Note that φ( 12 (e
2s − 1)) ≤ es√log 2s and thus, the law of the iterated logarithm im-
plies that
lim sup
t→∞
φ(〈Y 〉t )
t
≤ lim sup
t→∞
√
log(2t) log log(t log 2t)
t
= 0.
This accomplishes the proof of part (ii).
(iii) By Fubini’s theorem, we have
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
au
∫ u
0 e
bx dWx dudBs
t
= 1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−as ∫ s
0 e
bx dWx dBs
t
− 1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
(a+b)x dWx dBs
t
= 0,
where the last equality follows by part (ii). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.3. 
We proceed with the following statement.
Lemma 5.4 Let (Wt )t∈[0,∞) be a standard Brownian motion. Then we have
(i)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−as ∫ s
0 e
ax dWx ds
t
= 0 for all a > 0.
(ii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
au
∫ u
0 e
bx dWx duds
t
= 0 for all a, b > 0.
Proof (i) By using integration by parts and Fubini’s theorem, we get
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−as ∫ s
0 e
au dWu ds
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (Ws − ae−as
∫ s
0 e
auWu du)ds
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 Ws ds − a
∫ t
0 (e
auWu
∫ t
u
e−as ds) du
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
auWu du
teat
= 0,
where the last equality follows by the law of large numbers.
(ii) As in (i), one checks that the limit is equal to
1
a
lim
t→∞
(∫ t
0
e−bs
∫ s
0
ebx dWx ds −
∫ t
0
e−(a+b)s
∫ s
0
e(a+b)x dWx ds
)
,
which vanishes according to (i). 
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In the next limit theorems, the main tool is ergodicity of certain stochastic pro-
cesses. Similar ideas as below (even though we have provided a direct argument)
could be applicable to deduce the previous lemma.
Lemma 5.5 Let (Wt)t∈[0,∞) and (Bt )t∈[0,∞) be two independent Brownian motions.
Then the following hold:
(i)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−as ∫ s
0 e
ax dWxe
−bs ∫ s
0 e
bx dBx ds
t
= 0 for all a, b > 0.
(ii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (e
−as ∫ s
0 e
ax dWx)
2 ds
t
= 1
2a
for all a > 0.
(iii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
ax dWx
∫ s
0 e
bx dWx ds
t
= 1
a + b for all a, b > 0.
Proof (i) First observe that ∫ ·0 eax dWx is a martingale with 〈
∫ ·
0 e
ax dWx〉t = e2at−12a ,
and thus by the DDS theorem, we have
∫ t
0 e
ax dWx = W˜ e2at−1
2a
for some Brown-
ian motion (W˜t )t∈[0,∞). A similar argument implies that
∫ t
0 e
bx dBx = B˜ e2bt−1
2b
for
a Brownian motion (B˜t )t∈[0,∞). The construction in the DDS theorem implies that
(B˜t )t∈[0,∞) and (B˜t )t∈[0,∞) are independent. Recall that (e−at W˜e2at ) and (e−bt B˜e2bt )
are two independent stationary Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes; thus the process
(e−(a+b)t W˜e2at B˜e2bt ) is stationary. Therefore, an ergodic theorem for stationary pro-
cesses implies that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)sW˜e2as B˜e2bs ds
t
= e−(a+b)E[W˜e2a B˜e2b
] = 0. (5.6)
Next, the process (W ′t )t∈[0,∞) given by
W ′t =
{√
2aW˜ t
2a
for t < 1,√
2aW˜ t−1
2a
+ √2aW˜ 1
2a
for t ≥ 1
is a Brownian motion. Thus, we have W˜ e2as−1
2a
= 1√
2a
W ′
e2as
− W˜ 1
2a
for all s > 1. We
define the process (B ′t )t∈[0,∞) in a similar manner. We emphasize that (W ′t )t∈[0,∞)
and (W˜t )t∈[0,∞) are independent of (B ′t )t∈[0,∞) and (B˜t )t∈[0,∞). Thus we can rewrite
(5.6) as
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s( 1√
2a
W ′
e2as
− W˜ 1
2a
)( 1√
2b
B ′
e2bs
− B˜ 1
2a
) ds
t
.
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Next, the law of the iterated logarithm implies that for every ε > 0, there exists an
F∞-measurable random variable N(ε) : Ω → R+ such that for all s > N(ε), we have
| We2as
eas
√
log(2as)
| < 1 + ε, and hence
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 |e−as−bsW ′e2as |ds
t
≤ (1 + ε) lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
log(as)
ebs
ds
t
= 0.
This fact combined with (5.6) accomplishes the proof of part (i).
(ii) As in (i), ∫ s0 eax dWx = W˜ e2as−1
2a
and W˜ e2as−1
2a
= 1√
2a
W ′
e2as
− W˜ 1
2a
. Next, ergod-
icity yields
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (e
−asW˜e2as )2 ds
t
= 1
e2a
E
[
W˜ 2
e2a
] = 1.
Finally, the above limit combined with similar arguments to those appearing in (i)
concludes the proof.
(iii) The idea is to rewrite the required limit in terms of limits of the same form
as those in (ii). First, observe that e−at ∫ s0 eau dWu = Ws − ae−at
∫ s
0 e
auWu du. Thus
we can rewrite
∫ t
0
(
e−as
∫ s
0
eau dWu
)2
ds =
∫ t
0
W 2s ds − 2a
∫ t
0
e−asWs
∫ s
0
eauWu duds
+ a2
∫ t
0
e−2as
(∫ s
0
eauWu du
)2
du. (5.7)
Observe that Fubini’s theorem implies that
∫ t
0
e−2as
(∫ s
0
eauWu du
)2
du =
∫ t
0
∫ t
0
eax+ayWxWy
∫ t
max{x,y}
e−2as ds dx dy
= 1
a
∫ t
0
e−asWs
∫ s
0
eauWu duds − 12ae2at
(∫ t
0
Wxe
ax dx
)2
. (5.8)
This fact alongside (5.7) and (5.8) implies that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (e
−at ∫ s
0 e
au dWu)
2 ds
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 W
2
s ds − a
∫ t
0 e
−asWs
∫ s
0 e
auWu duds − a2e2at (
∫ t
0 e
asWs ds)
2
t
.
By using similar arguments and exploiting the preceding observations, one can check
294 R. Muraviev
that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
ax dWx
∫ s
0 e
bx dWx ds
t
= a
a + b limt→∞
∫ t
0 W
2
s ds − a
∫ t
0 e
−asWs
∫ s
0 e
auWu duds + a2e2at (
∫ t
0 e
asWs ds)
2
t
+ b
a + b limt→∞
∫ t
0 W
2
s ds − b
∫ t
0 e
−asWs
∫ s
0 e
auWu duds + a2e2at (
∫ t
0 e
asWs ds)
2
t
.
The latter fact combined with part (ii) completes the proof. 
The next statement is heavily based on the previous lemma.
Lemma 5.6 Let (Wt)t∈[0,∞) and (Bt )t∈[0,∞) be two independent Brownian motions.
Then we have
(i)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
ax
∫ x
0 e
bu dWu dx)
2 ds
t
= 1
2b(a + b)(a + 2b)
for all a, b > 0.
(ii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(2a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
au dWu
∫ s
0 e
bu
∫ u
0 e
ax dWx duds
t
= 1
2a(2a + b)
for all a, b > 0.
(iii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
(a−ξ)u ∫ u
0 e
ξu dWx du
∫ s
0 e
(b−ξ)u ∫ u
0 e
ξu dWx duds
t
= 1
(a − ξ)(b − ξ)
(
1
a + b +
1
2ξ
− 1
a + ξ −
1
b + ξ
)
for all a, b, ξ > 0.
(iv)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−2(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
ay
∫ y
0 e
bu dWu dy
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)x dWx ds
t
= 1
2(a + b)(a + 2b)
for all a, b > 0.
(v)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−2(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
ay
∫ y
0 e
bu dWu dy
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)x dBx ds
t
= 0 for all a, b > 0.
Proof (i) Notice that ∫ s0 eax
∫ x
0 e
bu dWu dx = 1a
∫ s
0 e
bu(eas − eau) dWu. Therefore,
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the required limit is equal to
1
a2
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (e
−bs ∫ s
0 e
bu dWu)
2 ds
t
− 2
a2
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+2b)s ∫ s
0 e
(a+b)u dWu
∫ s
0 e
bu dWu ds
t
+ 1
a2
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
(a+b)u dWu)2 ds
t
.
Parts (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 5.5 complete the proof of (i).
(ii) As before, one checks that the limit is equal to
1
b
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−2as(
∫ s
0 e
axdWx)
2 ds
t
− 1
b
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(2a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
au dWu
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)x dWx ds
t
,
and the rest is a consequence of parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 5.5.
(iii) The limit is equal to
1
(a − ξ)(b − ξ)
(
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (e
−au ∫ u
0 e
ax dWx)
2 du + ∫ t0 e−(a+b)u
∫ u
0 e
ax dWx
∫ u
0 e
bx dWx du
t
− lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+ξ)u ∫ u
0 e
ξx dWx
∫ u
0 e
ax dWx du +
∫ t
0 e
−(b+ξ)u ∫ u
0 e
ξx dWx
∫ u
0 e
bx dWx du
t
)
.
The rest follows by applying items (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 5.5.
(iv) One checks that the required limit is equal to
1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(2a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
bu dWu
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)x dWx ds
t
+ 1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s(
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)u dWu)2ds
t
,
and the rest follows by parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 5.5.
(v) As in (i), one checks that the limit is equal to
1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(2a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
bu dWu
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)x dBx ds
t
− 1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−2(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
(a+b)u dWu
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)x dBx ds
t
,
which vanishes due to part (i) of Lemma 5.5. 
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6 Proof of the main result
We provide here a proof for Theorem 4.2. Fix an arbitrary i = IK . Recall that∑N
j=1 cjt = Dt , and thus it suffices to show that limt→∞ citDt = 0. Note that (3.3)
implies that Mt ≥ cγIKIK0 MIKt . Therefore, (3.2) yields
cit
Dt
= c0i
(
Mit
Mt
)1/γi
≤ ci0
c
γIK /γi
IK0
(
Mit
MIKt
)1/γi
.
In virtue of (3.1), we have
Mit
MIKt
= exp(ai(t) − aIK (t)
)
,
where
aj (t) := (γj − 1)βjxt +
(
(σD)2
2
γj − ρj
)
t
+
∫ t
0
(
−γjμDs −
δ2js
2
)
ds +
∫ t
0
δjs dW
(0)
s − γjσDW(1)t
for all j = 1, . . . ,N . Therefore, in order to complete the proof of the statement, it
suffices to show that
lim
t→∞
ai(t) − aIK (t)
t
= κIK − κi < 0.
To this end, we proceed with the computation of the following limits.
Part I. We claim that
lim
t→∞
xt
t
= μ − 1
2
(
σD
)2
. (6.1)
Recall that by (2.3) and (2.1), we have
lim
t→∞
xt
t
= lim
t→∞
x0 + λ
∫ t
0 e
λs(
∫ s
0 μ
D
u du − 12 (σD)2s + σDW(1)s ) ds
teλt
.
Note that the law of large numbers implies that limt→∞
∫ t
0 e
λsW
(1)
s ds
teλt
= 0. Next, it is
evident that limt→∞ x0teλt = 0 and limt→∞
∫ t
0 se
λs ds
teλt
= 1/λ. Let us show that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 μ
D
u du
t
= μ. (6.2)
By (2.2), we get
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 μ
D
u du
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (μ + (μ0 − μ)e−ξs + σμ
∫ s
0 e
ξ(u−s) dW(2)u ) ds
t
.
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Clearly, we have limt→∞
∫ t
0 (μ+(μ0−μ)e−ξs ) ds
t
= μ. Furthermore, part (i) of Lemma 5.4
yields limt→∞
∫ t
0
∫ s
0 e
ξ(u−s) dW(2)u ds
t
= 0. This shows the validity of (6.2). Next, by
l’Hôpital’s rule, we get
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
λs
∫ s
0 μ
D
u duds
teλt
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 μ
D
s ds
λt + 1 =
μ
λ
,
proving (6.1).
Part II. We claim that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (δIKs − δis) dW(1)s
t
= 0.
By definition (see (2.12)), it suffices to verify that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 μ
D
js dW
(1)
s
t
= 0
holds for all j = 1, . . . ,N . It is not hard to check, by employing Lemma 5.1 com-
bined with the law of large numbers, that the preceding limit does not change when
the functions yiu, 1yiu and νiu are replaced by e
(αi2+ξ)t , e−(αi2+ξ)t and αi2(σD)2, re-
spectively. In view of the latter observation, by definition (see (2.8)), we need to show
that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 ((μi − μ)(1 − e−ξs) + (μ0i − μ0)e−ξs + ξμiξ+αi2 (1 − e−(ξ+αi2)s)) dW
(1)
s
t
+ αi2 lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(ξ+αi2)s ∫ s
0 e
(ξ+αi2)u(μ + (μ0 − μ)e−ξu) dudW(1)s
t
+ αi2σμ lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(ξ+αi2)s ∫ s
0 e
αi2u
∫ u
0 e
ξx dW
(2)
x dudW
(1)
s
t
+ σμφi lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(ξ+αi2)s ∫ s
0 e
(ξ+αi2)u dsu dW(1)s
t
= 0.
One checks that the first two terms vanish by the law of large numbers. The third and
fourth limits vanish by parts (iii) and (ii) of Lemma 5.3, respectively. This completes
the proof of the second part.
Part III. We have
1
2
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (δ
2
is − δ2IKs) ds
t
= 1
2
(
μi − μ
σD
)2
+ ξ
2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i )
− 1
2
(
μIK − μ
σD
)2
− ξ
2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφIK )
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2IK )
.
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This can be derived by applying Lemmas 5.3–5.6. The proof is now accomplished by
combining the above three parts, some routine algebraic transformations and the law
of large numbers. 
7 Interest rate and market price of risk: further long-run results
The current section deals with asymptotic results for the interest rate and the market
price of risk in heterogeneous economies. More precisely, it is shown that asymptoti-
cally, the latter parameters behave as those associated with a homogeneous economy
populated by the dominating consumer. Under some mild conditions, we prove that
the distance between these parameters in a heterogeneous economy and those asso-
ciated with any of the non-dominating consumer homogeneous economies becomes
unbounded as time goes to infinity.
7.1 Market price of risk
The next statement provides a full characterization of the market price of risk asymp-
totics in heterogeneous economies.
Theorem 7.1 (i) We have
lim
t→∞|θt − θIK t | = 0.
(ii) If φi = φIK for some i = IK , then
lim
t→∞(θt − θit ) = σ
D(γIK − γi) −
1
σD
(μIK − μi).
If φi (for some i = IK ) is such that
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i )
= ξ
2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφIK )
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2IK )
,
then
lim sup
t→∞
|θt − θit | = ∞.
Proof (i) First, we shall prove that limt→∞ ωit θit = 0, for all i = IK . As in Sect. 5,
the DDS theorem implies the existence of a Brownian motion (B˜(t))t∈[0,∞) such that
e−at
∫ t
0
eas dBs = e−at B˜ e2at−1
2a
,
where a > 0 is some constant and (Bt )t∈[0,∞) is a Brownian motion. By exploiting
the preceding fact, one checks that limt→∞
μDit√
log t < ∞ for all i = 0, . . . ,N , which
implies that
lim sup
t→∞
θjt√
log t
< ∞ (7.1)
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for j = 1, . . . ,N . On the other hand, Theorem 4.3 shows that ωit ≤ citDt maxi=1,...,N γi
and all i = IK . We have in particular proved in Sect. 6 that citDt ≤ e−ai t for some
ai > 0, for all i = IK . This implies that
ωit ≤ e−ai t max
i=1,...,N
γi (7.2)
holds for all i = IK , and thus by (7.1), we have ωit θit ≤ e−a′i t for all i = IK and some
constant a′i > 0. Therefore, by Proposition 3.4, we have
|θt − ωIKt θIK t | =
N∑
i=1,i =IK
ωit θit ≤
N∑
i=1,i =IK
e−a′i t . (7.3)
Finally, observe that |θt − θIK t | ≤ |θt − ωIKt θIK t | +
∑N
i=1,i =IK ωit θIK t because we
have
∑N
i=1 ωit = 1. The proof of part (i) follows from (7.1)–(7.3).
(ii) If φi = φIK , by part (i) we can substitute θT by θIKT . The assertion follows by
noting that
lim
t→∞|θIK t − θit | = limt→∞
∣
∣
∣
∣σ
D(γi − γIK ) +
1
σD
(μIKt − μit )
∣
∣
∣
∣.
Assume now that
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i )
= ξ
2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφIK )
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2IK )
.
By part (i), the claim is equivalent to proving that
lim sup
t→∞
∣
∣μDIKt − μDit
∣
∣ = ∞. (7.4)
First, one checks by employing Lemma 5.1 that the limit in (7.4) does not change
when we substitute νit , yit and 1yit by the terms αi2(σ
D)2, exp(−αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1 )e(αi2+ξ)t
and exp(αi2
αi1
e
− αi2
αi1 )e−(αi2+ξ)t , respectively. Next, note that Fubini’s theorem yields
αi2
e(ξ+αi2)T
∫ T
0
eαi2u
∫ u
0
eξx dW(2)x du
= 1
eξT
∫ T
0
eξu dW(2)u −
1
e(αi2+ξ)T
∫ T
0
e(αi2+ξ)u dW(2)u .
By exploiting the latter observations and the DDS theorem, one checks that
lim sup
t→∞
∣
∣μDit − μDIkt
∣
∣ = lim sup
t→∞
∣
∣fi(t) − fIk (t)
∣
∣,
where
fi(t) = 1√
(αi2 + ξ)t
(
σDαi2B
i1
t − σμ(φφi − 1)Bi2t + σμφi
√
1 − φ2Bi3t
)
.
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Here, Bi1,Bi2 and Bi3 denote three independent Brownian motions. By applying the
DDS theorem again, we can rewrite
fi(t) = 1√
(αi2 + ξ)t B
(i)
i t
, (7.5)
where B(i) is a Brownian motion, and
i =
(
σDαi2
)2 + (σμ)2(1 − φφi)2 +
(
σμφi
)2(1 − φ2).
Lastly, one checks that lim supt→∞ |fi(t) − fIk (t)| = ∞ by using the law of iterated
logarithm and (7.5), combined with the fact that
i
αi2 + ξ = −2ξσ
D + 2(σD)2 ξ
2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i )
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 7.1. 
7.2 Interest rate
Analogously to Theorem 7.1, we analyze in the next statement the asymptotics of the
interest rate in heterogeneous economies.
Theorem 7.2 (i) We have
lim
t→∞|rt − rIK t | = 0.
(ii) If γi = γIK , βi = βIK and φi = φIK for some i = IK , then
lim
t→∞(rt − rit ) = ρIK − ρi + γIK (μIK − μi).
If at least one of the conditions γi = γIK , βi = βIK and
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2i )
= ξ
2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φφIK )
2
√
ξ2 + (σμ/σD)2(1 − φ2IK )
does not hold for some i = IK , then
lim sup
t→∞
|rt − rit | = ∞.
Proof (i) By definition, we have
rt − ωit rit =
N∑
j=1,j =IK
ωjt rj t + 12
N∑
j=1
(1 − 1/γj )ωjt (θjt − θt )2
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for all i = 1, . . . ,N . We start by treating the second term. Observe that Theorem 4.3,
part (i) of Theorem 7.1, (7.4) and (7.2) imply that
N∑
j=1
(1 − 1/γj )ωjt (θjt − θt )2 ≤ e−a′t
for some constant a′ > 0. Next, note that (7.2) yields
N∑
j=1,j =IK
|ωjt rjt | ≤
N∑
j=1,j =IK
e−aj t |rjt |.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.2, one can check that lim supt→∞
rj t
t
< ∞ for all
j = 1, . . . ,N , and thus we conclude that
|rt − ωIKt rIK t | ≤ e−a
′t
for some constant a′ > 0. Finally, the proof of item (i) is accomplished by employing
the inequality |rt − rIK t | ≤ |rt − ωIKt rIK t | + rIK t |1 − ωIKt |, combined with the fact
that 1 = ∑Nj=1 ωjt , (7.2) and the fact that lim supt→∞ rj tt < ∞ for all j = 1, . . . ,N .(ii) If φi = φIK , γi = γIK and βi = βIK for some i = IK , the claim follows by
combining part (i) with the fact that
|rit − rIK t | =
∣
∣ρIK − ρi + γIK
(
μDIKt − μDit
)∣
∣.
Now, if at least one of the indicated conditions fails for some i = IK , the proof is
in the same spirit as the one of item (ii) of Theorem 7.1. The only difference is as
follows. If λ = ξ , one can check that the problem can be reduced to proving that
lim sup
t→∞
e−λt
(
σD
∫ t
0
eλu dW(1)u +
∫ t
0
∫ s
0
eλu dW(2)u ds
)
= ∞. (7.6)
If λ = 0, we need to prove that
lim sup
t→∞
(
σDW
(1)
t +
∫ t
0
W(2)s ds
)
= ∞.
Let G : C0([0,1];R) → R be given by G(f ) =
∫ 1
0 f (x)dx. Note that G is con-
tinuous, since |G(f ) − G(g)| ≤ ‖f − g‖∞ holds for all f,g ∈ C0([0,1];R). By
Strassen’s functional law of the iterated logarithm, we have
lim sup
N→∞
G
(
1√
2N log logN
W
(2)
Nx
)
= lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0 W
(2)
u du
N3/2
√
2 log logN
= max
f∈K(1)
G(f ),
where K(1) is given in Definition 5.2. Note that maxf∈K(1) G(f ) ≥ G(f0) > 0, where
f0(x) = x. Combining the fact they limt→∞ W
(1)
t
t3/2
√
log log t = 0 with the preceding ob-
servation shows that (7.6) holds for λ = 0. Assume next that λ = 0. By the DDS
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theorem, (7.6) is equivalent to
lim sup
t→∞
e−λt
(
σDB(1)
(
e2λt − 1
2λ
)
+
∫ t
0
B(2)
(
e2λs − 1
2λ
)
ds
)
= ∞,
where B(1) and B(2) denote two standard independent Brownian motions. By a
change of variables, the claim is equivalent to
lim sup
t→∞
1√
t
(
σDB(1)(t) +
∫ t
0
B(2)(u)
1 + 2λu du
)
= ∞. (7.7)
The law of the iterated logarithm yields limt→∞
∫ t
1
B(1)(u)
u(1+2λu) du√
t
= 0, and thus (7.7) can
be rewritten as
lim sup
t→∞
1√
t
(
σDB(1)(t) + 1
2λ
∫ t
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
= ∞.
Fix some 0 < ε < 1. Consider the functional H : C0([0,1];R2) → R, given by
H(f,g) := σDf (1) + 1
2λ
∫ 1
ε
g(u)
u
du.
Note that H is continuous, since
∣
∣H(f,g) − H(f̂ , ĝ)∣∣ ≤ σD‖f − f̂ ‖∞ − log ε2λ ‖g − ĝ‖∞
is satisfied for all f,g, f̂ , ĝ ∈ C0([0,1];R2). Next, Strassen’s functional law of the
iterated logarithm yields
lim sup
N→∞
H
(
1√
2N log logN
(
B(1)(Nt),B(2)(Nt)
)
)
= max
(f,g)∈K(2)
H(f,g),
where K(2) is introduced in Definition 5.2. Observe that
max
(f,g)∈K(2)
H(f,g) ≥ H(h,h) > 0,
where h(x) = x. Therefore, we obtain that
lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ (D)B(1)(N) + 1
2λ
∫ N
εN
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
> 0. (7.8)
We claim next that
lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ (D)B(1)(N) + 1
2λ
∫ N
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
> 0.
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Assume towards contradiction that this is not the case. Then, Kolmogorov’s 0-1 law
implies that
P
(
lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ (D)B(1)(N) + 1
2λ
∫ N
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
> 0
)
= 0.
Therefore, by exploiting the symmetry of Brownian motion, we obtain that
lim
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ (D)B(1)(N) + 1
2λ
∫ N
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
= 0
holds P -a.s. But since σD and λ were arbitrary, we obtain that
lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ (D)B(1)(N) + 1
2λ
∫ N
εN
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
= lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
(
σ (D) − √ε)B(1)(N) + 1
2λ
∫ N
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
+ B˜(1)(εN) − 1
2λ
∫ εN
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
= 0,
where B˜(1)(t) = √εB(1)( t
ε
), t ≥ 0, is a Brownian motion (independent of B(2)), and
ε > 0 is sufficiently small. This is a contradiction to (7.8), proving (7.7). 
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